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Paul Erdo˝s famously remarked that ‘a mathematician is a machine for turn-
ing coffee into theorems’ [9, p. 7]. The proof of mathematical theorems is central
to mathematical practice and to much recent debate about the nature of math-
ematics. This paper is an attempt to introduce a new perspective on the argu-
mentation characteristic of mathematical proof. I shall argue that this account,
an application of informal logic to mathematics, helps to clarify and resolve
several important philosophical difficulties.
It might be objected that formal, deductive logic tells us everything we need
to know about mathematical argumentation. I shall leave it to others [14, for
example] to address this concern in detail. However, even the protagonists of
explicit reductionist programmes—such as logicists in the philosophy of mathe-
matics and the formal theorem proving community in computer science—would
readily concede that their work is not an attempt to capture actual mathemat-
ical practice. Having said that, mathematical argumentation is certainly not
inductive either. Mathematical proofs do not involve inference from particular
observations to general laws. A satisfactory account of mathematical argumen-
tation must include deductive inference, even if it is not exhausted by it. It
must be complementary, rather than hostile, to formal logic. My contention is
that a suitable candidate has already been developed independently: informal
logic.
Informal logic is concerned with all aspects of inference, including those
which cannot be captured by logical form. It is an ancient subject, but has been
a degenerating research programme for a long time. Since the nineteenth century
it has been overshadowed by the growth of formal logic. More fundamentally,
it has suffered by identification with the simplistic enumeration of fallacies,
without any indication of the circumstances in which they are illegitimate. Since
most fallacies can be exemplified in some contexts by persuasive, indeed valid,
arguments, this approach is of limited use. In recent decades more interesting
theories have been developed. I shall look at two of the most influential, and
discuss their usefulness for the analysis of mathematical proof.
1 Toulmin’s pattern of argument
One of the first modern accounts of argumentation is that developed in Stephen
Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument [18]. Toulmin offers a general account of the
layout of an argument, as a claim (C) derived from data (D), in respect of a
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warrant (W). Warrants are general hypothetical statements of the form ‘Given
D, one may take it that C’ [18, p. 99]. Hence the laws of logic provide a warrant
for deductive inferences. However, the pattern is intended to be more general,
and provides for different, weaker warrants, although these would not permit us
to ascribe the same degree of certainty to C. This is recognized by the inclusion
of a modal qualifier (Q), such as ‘necessarily’, ‘probably’, ‘presumably’,. . . , in
the pattern. If the warrant is defeasible, we may also specify the conditions (R)
under which it may be rebutted. Finally, the argument may turn on the backing
(B) which can be provided for W. Toulmin’s claim is that the general structure
of a disparate variety of arguments may be represented as in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Toulmin’s DWC pattern
D
B
↓
W
↓
−→ Q−→ C
↑
R
Interpreting the letters as above, this diagrammay be read as follows: “Given
D, we can (modulo Q) claim C, since W (on account of B), unless R”. In Toul-
min’s vintage example: “Given that Harry was born in Bermuda, we can pre-
sumably claim that he is British, since anyone born in Bermuda will generally be
British (on account of various statutes . . . ), unless he’s a naturalized American,
or his parents were aliens, or . . . ”. In simpler examples B, Q and R may not all
be present, but D, W and C are taken to be essential to any argument, hence
the description of this model as the DWC pattern. Toulmin stresses the field de-
pendency of the canons of good argument: what counts as convincing may vary
substantially between the law court, the laboratory and the debating chamber.
In particular, what counts as acceptable backing will turn significantly on the
field in which the argument is conducted [18, p. 104].
Toulmin’s work has been very influential in the study of argument, despite
an initially chilly reception amongst philosophers and logicians.1 It was quickly
adopted by communication theorists, after the publication in 1960 of a cele-
brated paper by Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger [4]. Toulmin’s ac-
count of argumentation is now the dominant model in this field. More recently,
his work has been widely studied by computer scientists attempting to model
natural argumentation [13, for example]. One purpose of Toulmin’s critique of
logic is to dispute the utility of formal logic for the analysis of any argumenta-
tional discourse other than mathematics: he regards mathematical proof as one
1‘Unanimous . . . condemnation’ according to van Eemeren & al. [6, p. 164], who survey the
book’s reviewers.
of the few success stories for the formal logic tradition. Nevertheless, mathe-
matical proofs can be subsumed under the DWC pattern, where the warrant is
backed by various axioms, rules of inference and mathematical techniques pro-
viding grounds for supposing the claim to be necessary, given the data. Toulmin
provides an example in a later collaborative work [19, p. 89], by reconstructing
Theaetetus’s proof that there are exactly five polyhedra. The data and war-
rant consist of various facts about the platonic solids, the warrant is backed by
the axioms, postulates and definitions of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry,
and the modal qualifier ‘with strict geometrical necessity’ admits of no rebuttal
or exception within the bounds of Euclidean geometry.
2 Applying Toulmin to mathematics
The significance of Toulmin’s work for mathematical proof is explored at greater
length in what I believe to be the only study so far of the application of infor-
mal logic to mathematics, a paper written in Catalan by Jesu´s Alcolea Banegas
[1].2 Alcolea makes use of a further distinction of Toulmin’s, introduced in [19]:
that between regular and critical arguments. This distinction echoes Kuhn’s
contrast between normal and revolutionary science: a regular argument is an
argument within a field which appeals to the already well-established warrants
characteristic of the field, whereas a critical argument is an argument used to
challenge prevailing ideas, focusing attention on the assumptions which pro-
vide a backing for the warrants of regular arguments. Critical arguments must
therefore appeal to different warrants. Mathematical proofs are regular argu-
ments, although they may give rise to critical arguments if they are especially
interesting or controversial. Conversely, metamathematical debates are critical
arguments, but they often provide new opportunities for proofs, that is, regular
arguments.
Alcolea uses Toulmin’s layout to reconstruct one regular and one critical
argument from mathematics. The critical argument, the debate over the ad-
missibility of the axiom of choice, is the more fully developed and persuasive
of Alcolea’s case studies. It is perhaps not too surprising that critical argu-
ments in mathematics are similar to critical arguments in the other sciences,
since ultimately they are not arguments in mathematics, but arguments about
mathematics, that is to say they are metamathematical. However, my concern
is primarily with the argumentation of mathematics itself, rather than that of
metamathematics. Hence I shall concentrate on Alcolea’s example of a regular
argument: Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken’s proof of the four colour con-
jecture.3 He reconstructs the central argument of the proof as a derivation from
the data D1–D3
(D1) Any planar map can be coloured with five colours.
(D2) There are some maps for which three colours are insufficient.
(D3) A computer has analysed every type of planar map and verified
that each of them is 4-colorable.
of the claim C, that
2I am grateful to Miguel Gimenez of the University of Edinburgh for translating this paper.
3For further detail of the proof see [2], [25] or [12].
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(C) Four colours suffice to colour any planar map.
by employment of the warrant W , which has backing B
(W ) The computer has been properly programmed and its hardware
has no defects.
(B) Technology and computer programming are sufficiently reliable.
[1, pp. 142f.]
He regards this as making clear that, since the warrant is not wholly mathe-
matical, the proof must leave open the possibility of ‘a specific counterexample,
that is to say, a particular map that cannot be coloured with four colours might
still exist’ [1, p. 143].4
This example demonstrates both the strengths and the dangers of this ap-
proach. To complete Toulmin’s layout we are obliged to make explicit not merely
the premises and the conclusion, but also the nature of the support which the
former is supposed to lend the latter. Thus the the focus of Appel and Haken’s
critics, the heterodox deployment of a computer in a mathematical proof, is
made glaringly obvious. However, it is premature to draw from this surface
dissimilarity the inference that Appel and Haken’s result is less convincing than
other mathematical proofs. A closer reading of Alcolea’s reconstruction may
clarify this point. Premises D1 and D2 have conventional mathematical proofs,
as Alcolea points out. (D1 is not strictly relevant to the derivation of C, al-
though its proof originated techniques which were instrumental to Appel and
Haken’s work.) D3 is a very concise summary of the central results of Appel
and Haken’s work. It may help to spell out the details at greater length.
There are two essential ideas behind the Appel and Haken proof: unavoid-
ability and reducibility. An unavoidable set is a set of configurations, that is
countries or groups of adjacent countries, at least one of which must be present
in any planar map. For example, all such maps must contain either a two-sided,
a three-sided, a four-sided or a five-sided country, so these configurations con-
stitute an unavoidable set. A configuration is reducible if any map containing
it may be shown to be four-colorable. Two-sided, three-sided, and four-sided
countries are all reducible. To prove the four colour theorem it suffices to exhibit
an unavoidable set of reducible configurations. Alfred Kempe, who introduced
the concepts of unavoidability and reducibility, was believed to have proved
the four colour theorem in 1879 by showing that five-sided countries were also
reducible [11]. However, in 1890 a flaw was discovered in his reasoning: the
five-sided country is not reducible, hence a larger unavoidable set is required if
all its configurations are to be reducible. Appel and Haken used a computer
to search for such a set, eventually discovering one with 1,482 members. The
unavoidability of this set could be demonstrated by hand, but the reducibility
of all its members would be far too protracted a task for human verification.
Subsequent independent searches have turned up other unavoidable sets. The
smallest to date is a set of 633 reducible configurations found by Neil Robert-
son, Daniel Sanders, Paul Seymour and Robin Thomas in 1994.5 Verifying the
reducibility of these configurations still requires a computer.
4‘. . . un contraexemple espec´ific, e´s a dir, que es trobe un mapa particular que no puga
colarar-se amb quatre colors’
5For details of their publications, see [25, p. 244].
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So for there to be a non-four-colourable planar map, as Alcolea suggests, Ap-
pel and Haken (and their successors) must have erred either in the identification
of the unavoidable set, or in the demonstration of the reducibility of its member
configurations. Since the former step can be verified by conventional methods,
the computer can only be suspected of error in demonstrating reducibility. Two
sorts of computer error should be distinguished: a mistake may be made in
the programming, or a fault may arise in the computer itself (the hardware or
firmware). The former error would arise due to a human failure to correctly
represent the mathematical algorithms which the computer was programmed to
implement. This sort of mistake does not seem to be interestingly different from
the traditional type of mathematical mistake, such as that made by Kempe in
his attempt to prove the four colour conjecture. The second sort of error is
genuinely new. However, it would seem to be profoundly unlikely.
Computer hardware can exhibit persistent faults, some of which can be hard
to detect.6. However, the potential risks of such faults can be minimized by
running the program on many different machines. One might still worry about
Appel and Haken’s programs, since they were written in machine code and
would therefore be implemented in more or less exactly the same manner on
any computer capable of running them, perhaps falling foul of the same bug
each time. This sort of checking might be suspected of being no better than
buying two copies of the same newspaper to check the veracity of its reporting.7
However, the same reducibility results were achieved independently, using dif-
ferent programs, as part of the refereeing process for Appel and Haken’s work.
Moreover, the more recent programs of Robertson & al. were written in higher
level languages, as are the programs employed in most other computer-assisted
proofs. The existence of different compilers and different computer platforms
ensures that these programs can be implemented in many intrinsically differ-
ent ways, reducing the likelihood of hardware or firmware induced error to the
astronomical.
Thus we may derive an alternative reconstruction of Appel and Haken’s ar-
gument: “Given that (D4) the elements of the set U are reducible, we can (Q)
almost certainly claim that (C) four colours suffice to colour any planar map,
since (W ) U is an unavoidable set (on account of (B) conventional mathematical
techniques), unless (R) there has been an error in either (i) our mathematical
reasoning, or (ii) the hardware or firmware of all the computers on which the
algorithm establishing D4 has been run.” If, in addition, we observe that (i) ap-
pears to be orders of magnitude more likely than (ii), then C would seem to be
in much less doubt than it did in the light of Alcolea’s reconstruction. The pur-
pose of the preceding has been not so much to rescue the four colour conjecture
from Alcolea’s critique (although few if any graph theorists would accept that a
counterexample is possible), but to show up the limitations of Toulmin’s pattern
as a descriptive technique. As other critics have pointed out, reconstructing an
argument along Toulmin’s lines ‘forces us to rip propositions out of context’ [24,
p. 318]. The degree of abstraction necessary to use the diagram at all can make
different, incompatible, reconstructions possible, leaving the suspicion that any
such reconstruction may involve considerable (and unquantified) distortion.
6For example, the notorious Pentium bug.
7As Wittgenstein once remarked in a different context: [26, §265].
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3 Walton’s new dialectic
There has been significant progress in informal logic since the publication of
The uses of argument. One milestone was the publication of Charles Hamblin’s
Fallacies [8] in 1970. This demonstrated the inadequacies of much of traditional
fallacy theory and, by way of remedy, proposed an influential dialectical model
of argumentation. Further impetus has come from the recent work of commu-
nication theorists such as Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst [7]. One
contemporary logician who shows the influence of both traditions is Douglas
Walton.8 The focus of his work is the dialectical context of argument. Walton
distinguishes between ‘inference’, defined as a set of propositions, one of which
is warranted by the others, ‘reasoning’, defined as a chain of inferences, and ‘ar-
gument’, defined as a dialogue employing reasoning. This dialectical component
entails that arguments require more than one arguer: at the very least there
must be an assumed audience, capable in principle of answering back.
Winston Churchill once praised the argumentational skills of the celebrated
barrister and politician F. E. Smith, 1st Earl of Birkenhead, by stressing their
suitability to context: ‘The bludgeon for the platform; the rapier for a personal
dispute; the entangling net and unexpected trident for the Courts of Law; and
a jug of clear spring water for an anxious perplexed conclave’ [5, p. 176]. Toul-
min also stresses the domain specificity of good practice in argument. What
is distinctive about Walton’s analysis is the attempt to characterize dialectical
context in terms of general features which are not themselves domain specific.
Without pretending to have an exhaustive classification of argumentational di-
alogue, he is able to use these features to draw several important distinctions.
The principal features with which he is concerned are the ‘initial situation’ and
the ‘main goal’ of the dialogue. The initial situation describes the circumstances
which give rise to the dialogue, in particular the differing commitments of the
interlocutors. The main goal is the collective outcome sought by both (all)
participants, which may be distinct from their individual goals.
Table 1: Walton & Krabbe’s ‘Systematic survey of dialogue types’ [23, p. 80]
M
a
in
G
o
a
l
Initial Situation
Conflict Open Problem Unsatisfactory
Spread of
Information
Stable Agreement/
Resolution
Persuasion Inquiry Information
Seeking
Practical Settlement/
Decision (Not) to Act
Negotiation Deliberation
Reaching a (Provisional)
Accommodation
Eristic
If we simplify the situation by permitting each discussant to regard some
crucial proposition as either true, false or unknown, four possibilities emerge.
Either (0) the discussants agree that the proposition is true (or that it is false),
in which case there is no dispute; or (1) one of them takes it to be true and the
8Walton has published a great number of works on informal logic. [22] provides an overview
of the general method common to many of them.
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other false, in which case they will be in direct conflict with each other; or (2)
they both regard it as unknown, which may result in a dialogue as they attempt
to find out whether it is true or false; or (3) one of them believes the propo-
sition to be true (or false) but the other does not know which it is. Thus we
may distinguish three types of initial situation from which an argumentational
dialogue may arise: a conflict, an open problem, or an unsatisfactory spread
of information. A conflict may produce several different types of dialogue de-
pending on how complete a resolution is sought. For a stable outcome one
interlocutor must persuade the other, but, even if such persuasion is impossible
they may still seek to negotiate a practical compromise on which future action
could be based. Or they may aim merely to clear the air by expressing their
contrasting opinions, without hoping to do more than merely agree to disagree:
a quarrel. These three goals—stable resolution, practical settlement and provi-
sional accommodation—can also be applied to the other two initial situations,
although not all three will be exemplified in each case. So open problems can
lead to stable resolutions, or if this is not achievable, to practical settlement.
However, provisional accommodation should not be necessary if the problem
is genuinely open, since neither discussant will be committed to any specific
view. Where the dialogue arises merely from the ignorance of one party then
a stable resolution should always be achievable, obviating the other goals. The
interplay of these different types of initial situation and main goal thus allows
Walton to identify six principal types of dialogue, Persuasion, Negotiation, Eris-
tic, Inquiry, Deliberation and Information Seeking, which may be represented
diagrammatically as in Table 1. The contrasting properties of these different
types of dialogue are set out in Table 2. This table also states the individual
goals of the interlocutors typical to each type, and includes two derivative types:
the debate, a mixture of persuasion and eristic dialogue, and the pedagogical
dialogue, a subtype of the information seeking dialogue. Many other familiar
argumentational contexts may be represented in terms of Walton’s six basic
types of dialogue by such hybridization and subdivision.9
It is central to Walton’s work that the legitimacy of an argument should
be assessed in the context of its use: what is appropriate in a quarrel may be
inappropriate in an inquiry, and so forth. Although some forms of argument are
never legitimate (or never illegitimate), most are appropriate if and only if they
are “in the right place”. For example, threats are inappropriate as a form of
persuasion, but they can be essential in negotiation. In an impressive sequence
of books, Walton has analyzed a wide variety of fallacious or otherwise illicit
argumentation as the deployment of strategies which are sometimes admissible
in contexts in which they are inadmissible. However, Walton has not directly
addressed mathematical argumentation. In the next section I shall set out to
explore how well his system may be adapted to this purpose.
4 Applying Walton to mathematics
In what context (or contexts) do mathematical proofs occur? The obvious an-
swer is that mathematical proof is a special case of inquiry. Indeed, Walton
states that the collective goal of inquiry is to ‘prove or disprove [a] conjecture’.
An inquiry dialogue proceeds from an open problem to a stable agreement.
9See Table 3.1 in [23, p. 66] for some further examples.
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Table 2: Walton’s types of dialogue [21, p. 605]
Type of
Dialogue
Initial
Situation
Individual
Goals of
Participants
Collective
Goal of
Dialogue
Benefits
Persuasion Difference of
opinion
Persuade
other party
Resolve differ-
ence of opinion
Understand
positions
Inquiry Ignorance Contribute
findings
Prove or
disprove
conjecture
Obtain
knowledge
Deliberation Contemplation
of future con-
sequences
Promote per-
sonal goals
Act on a
thoughtful
basis
Formulate
personal
priorities
Negotiation Conflict of in-
terest
Maximize
gains (self-
interest)
Settlement
(without un-
due inequity)
Harmony
Information-
Seeking
One party
lacks informa-
tion
Obtain infor-
mation
Transfer of
knowledge
Help in goal
activity
Quarrel
(Eristic)
Personal
conflict
Verbally hit
out at and
humiliate
opponent
Reveal deeper
conflict
Vent emotions
Debate Adversarial Persuade third
party
Air strongest
arguments for
both sides
Spread
information
Pedagogical Ignorance of
one party
Teaching and
learning
Transfer of
knowledge
Reserve
transfer
That is to say from an initial situation of mutual ignorance, or at least lack of
commitment for or against the proposition at issue, to a main goal of shared en-
dorsement or rejection of the proposition. This reflects a standard way of reading
mathematical proofs: the prover begins from a position of open-mindedness to-
wards the conjecture, shared with his audience. He then derives the conjecture
from results upon which they both agree, by methods which they both accept.
But this is not the only sort of dialogue in which a mathematical proof may
be set out. As William Thurston has remarked, mathematicians ‘prove things in
a certain context and address them to a certain audience’ [17, p. 175]. Indeed,
crucially, there are several different audiences for any mathematical proof, with
different goals. Satisfying the goals of one audience need not satisfy those of the
others. For example, a proof may be read by:
• Journal referees, who have a professional obligation to play devil’s advo-
cate;
• Professional mathematicians in the same field, who may be expected to
quickly identify the new idea(s) that the proof contains, grasping them
with only a few cues, but who may already have a strong commitment to
the falsehood of the conjecture;
• Professional mathematicians in other (presumably neighbouring) fields,
who will need more careful and protracted exposition;
• Students and prospective future researchers in the field, who could be
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put off by too technical an appearance, or by the impression that all the
important results have been achieved;
• Posterity, or in more mercenary terms, funding bodies: proof priority can
be instrumental in establishing cudos with both.
This list suggests that the initial situation of a proof dialogue cannot always
be characterized as mutual open-mindedness. Firstly, in some cases, the re-
lationship between the prover and his audience will be one of conflict. If the
conjecture is a controversial one, its prover will have to convince those who are
committed to an incompatible view. And if an article is refereed thoroughly,
the referees will be obliged to adopt an adversarial attitude, irrespective of their
private views.
Secondly, as the later items indicate, proofs have a pedagogic purpose.
Thurston relates his contrasting experiences in two fields to which he made
substantial contributions. As a young mathematician, he proved many results
in foliation theory using powerful new methods. However, his proofs were of
a highly technical nature and did little to explain to the audience how they
too might exploit the new techniques. As a result, the field evacuated: other
mathematicians were afraid that, by the time they had mastered Thurston’s
methods, he would have proved all the important results. In later work, on
Haken manifolds, he adopted a different approach. By concentrating on prov-
ing results which provided an infrastructure for the field, in a fashion which
allowed others to acquire his methods, he was able to develop a community of
mathematicians who could pursue the field further than he could alone. The
price for this altruism was that he could not take all the credit for the major
results. Proofs which succeed in the context Thurston advocates proceed from
an initial situation closer to Walton’s ‘unsatisfactory spread of information’.
This implies that information seeking is another context in which mathematical
proofs may be articulated. Of course, the information which is being sought is
not merely the conjecture being proved, but also the methods used to prove it.
An unsatisfactory spread of information, unlike a conflict or an open prob-
lem, is an intrinsically asymmetrical situation. We have seen that proofs can
arise in dialogues wherein the prover possesses information sought by his inter-
locutors. Might there be circumstances in which we should describe as a proof
a dialogue in which the prover is the information seeker? This is the question
considered by Thomas Tymoczko [20, p. 71] and Yehuda Rav [14], to somewhat
different ends. Tymoczko considers a community of Martian mathematicians
who have amongst their number an unparalleled mathematical genius, Simon.
Simon proves many important results, but states others without proof. Such is
his prestige, that “Simon says” becomes accepted as a form of proof amongst
the Martians. Rav considers a fantastical machine, Pythiagora, capable of an-
swering mathematical questions instantaneously and infallibly. Both thought
experiments consider the admission of a dialogue with an inscrutable but far
better informed interlocutor as a possible method of proof.
In both cases we are invited to reject this admission, although, interestingly,
for different reasons. Rav sees his scenario as suggesting that proof cannot be
purely epistemic: if it were then Pythiagora would give us all that we needed,
but Rav suggests that we would continue to seek conventional proofs for their
other explanatory merits. He concludes that Pythiagora could not give us proof.
Tymoczko draws an analogy between his thought experiment and the use of
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computers in proofs such as that of the four colour theorem. He argues that
there is no formal difference between claims backed by computer and claims
backed by Simon: they are both appeals to authority. The difference is that
the computer can be a warranted authority. Hence, on Tymoczko’s admittedly
controversial reading, computer assisted proof is an information seeking dialogue
between the prover and the computer.
So far we have seen that the initial situation of a proof dialogue can vary from
that of an inquiry. What of the main goal—must this be restricted to stable res-
olution? Some recent commentators have felt the need for a less rigorous form of
mathematics, with a goal closer to Walton’s practical settlement. Arthur Jaffe
and Frank Quinn [10] introduced the much discussed, if confusingly named, con-
cept of ‘theoretical mathematics’. They envisage a division of labour, analogous
to that between theoretical and experimental physics, between conjectural or
speculative mathematics and rigorous mathematics. Where traditional, rigorous
mathematicians have theorems and proofs, theoretical mathematicians make do
with ‘conjectures’ and ‘supporting arguments’. This echoes an earlier sugges-
tion by Edward Swart [16] that we should refrain from accepting as theorems
results which depend upon lengthy arguments, whether by hand or computer,
of which we cannot yet be wholly certain. He suggests that ‘these additional en-
tities could be called agnograms, meaning theoremlike statements that we have
verified as best we can but whose truth is not known with the kind of assurance
that we attach to theorems and about which we must thus remain, to some
extent, agnostic’ [16, p. 705]. In both cases the hope is that further progress
will make good the shortfall: neither Jaffe and Quinn’s conjectures nor Swart’s
agnograms are intended as replacements for rigorously proved theorems.
More radical critics of the accepted standards of mathematical rigour sug-
gest that practical settlement can be a goal of proof and not merely of lesser,
analogous activities. For instance, Doron Zeilberger [27] envisages a future of
semi-rigorous (and ultimately non-rigorous) mathematics in which the ready
availability by computer of near certainty reduces the pursuit of absolute cer-
tainty to a low resource allocation priority. Hence he predicts that a mathemat-
ical abstract of the future could read “We show, in a certain precise sense, that
the Goldbach conjecture is true with probability larger than 0.99999, and that
its complete truth could be determined with a budget of $10 billion” [27, p. 980].
‘Proofs’ of this sort explicitly eschew stable resolution for practical settlement.
Thus Zeilberger is arguing that proofs could take the form of deliberation or
negotiation.
The last of Walton’s dialogue types is the eristic dialogue, in which no settle-
ment is sought, merely a provisional accommodation in which the commitments
of the parties are made explicit. This cannot be any sort of proof, since no
conclusion is arrived at. But it is not completely without interest. A familiar
diplomatic euphemism for a quarrel is “a full and frank exchange of views”,
and such activity does have genuine merit. Similarly, even failed mathematical
proofs can be of use, especially if they clarify previously imprecise concepts, as
we saw with Kempe’s attempted proof of the four colour conjecture [11]. This
process has something in common, if not with a quarrel, at least with a debate,
which we saw to be a related type of dialogue.
To take stock, we have seen that most of Walton’s dialogue types are reflected
to some degree in mathematical proof. Table 3, an adaptation of Table 2, sets
out the difference between the various types of proof dialogue introduced.
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Table 3: Some types of proof dialogue
Type of
Dialogue
Initial
Situation
Main Goal Goal of
Prover
Goal of
Interlocutor
Proof as
Inquiry
Open-
mindedness
Prove or dis-
prove conjec-
ture
Contribute to
outcome
Obtain
knowledge
Proof as
Persuasion
Difference of
opinion
Resolve differ-
ence of opinion
with rigour
Persuade
interlocutor
Persuade
prover
Proof as
Information-
Seeking
(Pedagogical)
Interlocutor
lacks
information
Transfer of
knowledge
Disseminate
knowledge of
results &
methods
Obtain
knowledge
‘Proof’ as
Information-
Seeking (e.g.
Tymoczko)
Prover lacks
information
Transfer of
knowledge
Obtain
information
Presumably
inscrutable
‘Proof’ as
Deliberation
(e.g. Swart)
Open-
mindedness
Reach a
provisional
conclusion
Contribute to
outcome
Obtain
warranted
belief
‘Proof’ as
Negotiation
(e.g.
Zeilberger)
Difference of
opinion
Exchange
resources for a
provisional
conclusion
Contribute to
outcome
Maximize
value
of exchange
‘Proof’ as
Eristic/
Debate
Irreconcilable
difference of
opinion
Reveal deeper
conflict
Clarify
position
Clarify
position
5 Proof dialogues
In this last section I shall explore how the classification of proof dialogues may
help to clarify many of the problems that have arisen in the philosophical debate
over the nature of mathematical proof. We can see that proofs may occur in
several distinct types of dialogue, even if we do not count the suspect cases (the
entries for Table 3 where ‘proof’ is in scare quotes). An ideal proof will succeed
within inquiry, persuasion and pedagogic proof dialogues. Suboptimal proofs
may fail to achieve the goals of at least one of these dialogue types. In some
cases, this may be an acceptable, perhaps inevitable, shortcoming; in others it
would fatally compromise the argument’s claim to be accepted as a proof.
As Thurston’s experience with foliation theory demonstrated, not every
proof succeeds pedagogically. Proofs in newly explored areas are often hard to
follow, and there are some results which have notoriously resisted all attempts at
clarification or simplification.10 Yet, if these proofs succeed in inquiry and per-
suasion dialogues, we have no hesitation in accepting them. Conversely, there
are some ‘proofs’ which have a heuristic usefulness in education, but which would
not convince a more seasoned audience. Pedagogic success is neither necessary
nor sufficient for proof status—but it is a desirable property, nonetheless.
An argument might convince a neutral audience, but fail to persuade a de-
termined sceptic. Just this happened to Andrew Wiles’s first attempt at a proof
10For example, von Staudt’s proof of the equivalence of analytic and synthetic projective
geometry has retained its difficulty for nearly two centuries. See [15, pp. 193 f.] for a discussion.
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of the Fermat conjecture: the initial audience were convinced, but the argument
ran into trouble when exposed to determined criticism from its referees. Such a
case might be seen as success within an inquiry proof dialogue, followed by fail-
ure in a persuasion proof dialogue. A similar story could be told about Kempe’s
‘proof’ of the four colour conjecture: a result which received far less scrutiny
than Wiles’s work, and was thereby widely accepted for eleven years. On the
other hand, if even the sceptics are convinced, then an open-minded audience
should follow suit. Thus, on the conventional understanding of mathematical
rigour, success within both inquiry and persuasion proof dialogues is necessary
for an argument to count as a proof.
We saw in the last section how a variety of differently motivated departures
from the prevailing standards of mathematical rigour may be understood as
different types of proof dialogue. One of Walton’s principal concerns in his
analysis of natural argumentation is the identification of shifts from one type of
dialogue to another. Such shifts can take a variety of forms: either gradual or
abrupt, and either replacing the former type of dialogue or embedding the new
type within the old. These processes are an essential and productive aspect of
argumentation, but they are also open to abuse. Similar warnings apply to the
less rigorous types of proof dialogue.
Many of the concerns which the critics of these forms of argumentation
have advanced may be understood as an anxiety about illicit shifts of proof
dialogue type. For example, the published discussion of mathematical conjecture
is something which Jaffe and Quinn welcome: their concern is that such material
not be mistaken for theorem-proving. Although some of their critics interpreted
their advocacy of ‘theoretical mathematics’ as a radical move, their primary goal
was a conservative one: to maintain a sharp demarcation between rigorous and
speculative work. Their ‘measures to ensure “truth in advertising” ’ [10, p. 10]
are precisely calculated to prevent illicit shifts between inquiry and deliberation
proof dialogues.11 A similar story could be told about Tymoczko or Swart’s
discussion of methods they see as falling short of conventional rigour. Zeilberger
is advocating the abandonment of rigour, but he recognizes at least a temporary
imperative to separate rigorous from ‘semi-rigorous’ mathematics.
As Toulmin & al. remark ‘it has never been customary for philosophers to
pay much attention to the rhetoric of mathematical debate’ [19, p. 89]. The
goal of this article has been to exhibit some of the benefits that may accrue
from a similarly uncustomary interest in informal logic.
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